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3E X EC U T I V E  SU M M A RY
There is a lot of debate and controversy over the levels of 
popular and elite polarization in Turkey, which intensi-
fied after the July 15th coup attempt.1 This report looks 
at the factors driving popular polarization in Turkey 
by focusing on elite views on political polarization. 
Hence, rather than measuring the levels of elite and/
or popular polarization in Turkey, we look at how the 
Turkish elite views claims for increasing polarization 
in the country. This is done by discussing the results of 
a closed workshop and in-depth qualitative interviews 
conducted with selected political elites on polarization 
in Turkey. The report finds that Turkey’s elites are so 
polarized that they cannot even near a consensus over 
whether polarization exists in the country. Drawing 
on the insights from the workshop and the interviews, 
particularly regarding the reasons put forward for 
polarization and the possible solutions towards tack-
ling it, certain policy recommendations are made in 
the report with a view to attain societal reconciliation 
in Turkey.
 
1 This policy report is written as part of the Post-Coup Opportunities on 
Conflict Resolution and Democracy Project conducted by the Conflict 
Resolution and Mediation Stream of Istanbul Policy Center.
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I N T R O D UCT I O N
Popular polarization refers to a situation where the 
electorate’s attitudes towards social and political issues 
become heavily divided along partisan lines. There has 
been a lot of discussion concerning polarization in 
Turkey in recent years, which has intensified further 
in the aftermath of the July 15th coup attempt. There is 
now a growing consensus in the literature that Turkey’s 
population is currently polarized more than ever over 
many political and cultural issues, including economic 
policy, democracy, secularism, and foreign policy. This 
rise in polarization, which is related to many factors 
from rising populism to partisanship in the media, has 
substantive policy consequences such as increased 
levels of political gridlock that encourage centraliza-
tion of authority; decreased capability to adjust to 
changes in economic, social, or demographic state of 
affairs; an increase in social and political discontent;2 
and negative impacts on economic development.3 
This report looks at the factors driving popular polari-
zation in Turkey by focusing on elite views on political 
polarization. Hence, rather than measuring the levels 
of elite and/or popular polarization in Turkey, we look 
at how the Turkish elite views claims for increasing 
polarization in the country. This is done by discussing 
the results of a closed workshop and in-depth qualita-
tive interviews conducted with selected political elites 
on polarization in Turkey. The closed workshop on 
“Polarization, Reconciliation and Democracy in Turkey 
after July 15” was held at the Istanbul Policy Center 
(IPC) on January 17, 2017, with the attendance of 24 
participants comprising of prominent representatives 
from academia, think tanks, civil society organizations, 
and the media. In-depth interviews were conducted in 
Ankara from January 4-5, 2017, with eight members of 
parliament from several political parties including the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi - AKP), Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi - CHP), Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halk-
ların Demokratik Partisi - HDP), and one former mem-
2 Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray, “Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polar-
ization,” The American Economic Review 101, no. 4 (2011): 1345-1374.
3 Keefer Philip and Stephen Knack, “Polarization, Politics and Proper-
ty Rights: Links between Inequality and Growth,” Public Choice 111, no. 1 
(2002): 127-154.
ber of parliament from the Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - MHP).4 
4 Both the workshop and the interviews were carried out as part of the 
Post-Coup Opportunities on Conflict Resolution and Democracy Project. 
Members of parliament from the MHP that were contacted did not accept 
to be interviewed with the exception of one former member of parliament 
from the party. 
5I S  T U R K E Y  P O L A R I Z E D ?
Turkish society has long been divided along strong 
ethnic and secular-conservative cleavages as reflected 
to some extent by the Turkish party system. However, 
surveys show that political parties have recently 
become more clearly sorted on moral and cultural 
issues while social distance along partisan lines has 
been growing, pointing to increasing levels of party-
driven political and societal polarization in Turkey. For 
example, a 2016 survey entitled “Dimensions of Polari-
zation in Turkey,” conducted by the Association of 
Corporate Responsibility, found high levels of societal 
polarization along party lines. To measure the social 
distance between constituencies of different political 
party supporters, the survey asked each respondent 
from which party he/she feels most distant. About 
65 percent of AKP voters expressed that the party 
furthest from their worldview was the HDP, whereas 
for 61 percent of voters belonging to the main opposi-
tion party, CHP, this party was the AKP. The survey 
revealed that 78 percent of respondents reject the idea 
of doing business with someone who votes for the party 
that they feel most distant from, while 74 percent reject 
the idea of their children playing with children from 
families supporting that party.5 These results show 
that a deep and extensive political antipathy manifests 
itself in many ways, both in politics and everyday life in 
Turkey.
Research on the public’s view on polarization in 
Turkey shows that the Turkish public agrees with the 
arguments in favor of the existence of polarization in 
the country. In January 2017, Kadir Has University 
reported its Survey of Social-Political Trends in 
Turkey, which showed that 61.7 percent of the Turkish 
public thinks that the country is polarized. Of these, 
47.6 percent thinks that polarization is driven by the 
secular-conservative divide, 21.9 percent believes that 
it is caused by the left-right cleavage, whereas 15.2 
percent thinks that it is reflective of the East-West 
divide in the country.6 Hence, the limited but current 
research suggests that high degrees of popular polariza-
tion are a current reality of the country, and the public 
itself overwhelmingly believes that this is indeed the 
case. 
5 Emre Erdoğan, “Turkey: Divided We Stand,” GMFUS, April 12, 2016, ac-
cessed February 20, 2017, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-di-
vided-we-stand. 
6 Özge Özdemir, “Muhafazakar Kesim Kutuplaşmaya Nasıl Bakıyor?” 
BBC, January 27, 2017, accessed February 20, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/
turkce/haberler-turkiye-38667730. 
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W H AT  D R I V E S  P O L A R I Z AT I O N ?
Elite polarization and populism
Some scholars argue that elite polarization is one of the 
major factors behind popular polarization. Although 
voters may also have polarizing tendencies, in isolation 
this process is slow and imperfect. Elite polarization, 
however, eventually leads to increased awareness of 
party differences by the electorate and can thus have 
a major impact on the ways in which the public takes 
political decisions.7 The existing literature has shown 
that polarized political environments can fundamen-
tally change the ways in which citizens reach political 
decisions. When elites are highly polarized, this ampli-
fies the impact of party positions on citizens’ opinions 
and makes them less reliant on substantial “facts” 
and more on “partisan endorsements” in taking their 
decisions.8 Hence, elite polarization tends to decrease 
citizens’ openness to alternative viewpoints, which in 
turn restricts the public space for diversified political 
contestation—a key to a consolidated and healthy func-
tioning democracy. 
The role of populism is crucial for explaining how elite 
polarization leads to popular polarization. Populism is 
a monist, moralist ideology that appeals to emotions 
and values by creating antagonistic identities. Although 
many definitions of populism abound, the one by the 
prominent populism scholar Cas Mudde is widely 
accepted in the literature. Mudde defines populism 
as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic 
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of 
the volonté général (general will) of the people.”9 This 
uncompromising stand eventually leads to a polar-
ized political culture.10 Populist parties send clear, 
exclusivist cues to the electorate, which then gradu-
ally identifies itself through more clearly identifiable 
categories in relation to its various “Other(s)” in 
society. Especially when there are strong religious and 
ethnic cleavages within society, populist politicians 
7 Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, “Political Polarization in the 
American Public,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 563-588. 
8 James N. Druckman, Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus, “How Elite Par-
tisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation,” American Political 
Science 107, no. 1 (2013): 57-79.
9 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39 
(2004): 542.
10 Cas Mudde, “The Problem with Populism,” The Guardian, Febru-
ary 17, 2015, accessed February 20, 2017, https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syriza-podem-
os-dark-side-europe.
have more opportunities to utilize them by framing 
these differences as sources of existential threats to the 
larger group identity.
Populist leaders fuel societal polarization not only 
through their discourse but also via their authoritarian 
mode of governance that relies on the use of majori-
tarian instruments such as referenda rather than a 
system that prioritizes checks and balances and the 
protection of minority rights. Authoritarian tenden-
cies seem to be bolstered in those cases where there is 
already existent societal polarization in a given coun-
try.11 Strong leadership combined with authoritarian 
rule can run the risk of boosting further polarization, 
resulting in the building of a vicious cycle of populist 
rule that becomes increasingly difficult to break. 
Applied to the case of Turkey, it can be argued that the 
rise of right-wing populism espoused by the governing 
party, AKP, particularly since 2011, has contributed to 
the growing polarization within Turkish society. The 
imposed worldview of the “people” vs. the “elite” where 
the party and its leader are represented as “the voice” 
of the genuine “will of the people” as opposed to that 
of the “elite” identified with the opposition has helped 
to foster a binary worldview across society. Majoritari-
anism has also been the preferred mode of governance 
where those in opposition were marginalized not only 
through party political discourse but also through the 
restriction of the democratic space in which they can 
exercise their basic rights and freedoms. 
Structural causes 
Growing ideological distance is not, however, confined 
to partisanship. The culture war narrative assumes that 
politics is increasingly divided into two value camps: 
cultural conservatives with a religious view of morality 
and cultural progressives with a secular view. In turn, 
it is argued that these divergences in cultural value 
systems provide a rich ground for political polarization 
to flourish worldwide.12 However, there is growing 
empirical evidence that cultural divisions interact 
closely with educational, generational, and economic 
factors. Regarding voter demographics, there is much 
evidence that educational attainment is one of the 
11 Marc J. Hetherington and Jonathan D. Weiler, Authoritarianism and Po-
larization in American Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009).
12 Michael E. Sobel and Ted Mouw, “Culture Wars and Opinion Polarization: 
The Case of Abortion,” American Journal of Sociology 106, no. 4 (2001): 
913-943.
7main influences in voting behavior. Over the past 
decade, ideological differences across generations have 
also widened: while younger generations remain less 
polarized and more progressive, older generations are 
more conservative and polarized. 
Concerning the Turkish case, it has been found 
that a growing Kulturkampf is defining the political 
landscape across the country. In other words, Turkish 
voters seem to be divided sharply along value lines, 
between the more “socio-cultural liberal and secular” 
classes and the more “religious conservative” masses 
in society.13 While this divide has been present for 
decades, there is wide agreement that its centrality in 
politics has increased significantly especially after the 
2007 general elections.14 
Institutional causes
Political polarization also has institutional causes. As 
much as elections are the most important institutions 
of democratic society, they also polarize societies. 
Remaining in electioneering mode, without giving 
the community the time to rebuild and develop new 
means of consensus, ultimately increases polarization. 
This is especially true for referenda where the options 
are presented in black and white. Furthermore, when 
“political parties choose to treat referenda as elections, 
voters’ predispositions are more likely to be reinforced 
and partisan voting is more likely to prevail.”15 In the 
course of the last five years, Turkey has gone through 
one presidential election and local elections in 2014, 
two general elections in 2015, and an upcoming refer-
endum on the introduction of a presidential system in 
2017. Hence in the Turkish case, with the exception of 
one year, electioneering has been a constant state of 
affairs in the political life of the country over the last 
five years. This, in turn, has contributed to the suste-
nance of the high intensity of political debates and 
consolidation of stark divisions across partisan lines. 
Another institutional cause of political polarization is 
the erosion of public institutions. Institutions should 
build bridges between the members of a community. 
However, polarization (and populism) can generate 
strong partisan critiques of major democratic institu-
tions, such as the judiciary, which may then damage the 
credibility and legitimacy of these institutions. Partisan 
nominations further contribute to these institutions’ 
13 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referen-
dum of 12 September 2010,” South European Society and Politics 17, no. 1 
(2012): 1-22.
14 Ibid.
15 Ece Özlem Atikcan and Kerem Öge, “Referendum Campaigns in Polar-
ized Societies: The Case of Turkey,” Turkish Studies 13, no. 3 (2012): 449.
declining credibility. The erosion of moderating insti-
tutions, in turn, sharply increases political polariza-
tion. For example, as the Kadir Has survey shows, there 
is no institution that Turkish citizens trust in common 
while overall public trust in institutions has declined 
sharply. The most trusted institution in Turkey is the 
presidency, with 49.4 percent of citizens declaring their 
trust. Previously, the Turkish military was always iden-
tified as the most trusted institution. However, after 
the July 15th coup attempt, trust in the Turkish military 
declined. While 62.4 percent of participants trusted 
the military the most in 2015, it was only the second 
most trusted institution in 2016, equal to the police at 
47.4%.16 
Media Polarization
In Turkey, where approximately half of all households 
have access to the internet and where traditional media 
sources have increasingly been silenced by the govern-
ment, social media has over the recent years become a 
key source of news and information as well as a public 
platform for political debate for an important segment 
of the citizenry. However, there is much evidence that 
shows the proliferation of media sources has increased 
polarization rather than strengthened public delibera-
tion across the world.17 Contrary to the longstanding 
argument that mass media tends to induce conformity 
and reduce polarization, it is now claimed that the new 
media (social media, cable TV, etc.) enables people 
to interact with like-minded individuals so that the 
political opinions they hear through these channels are 
often in line with their own views. Thus, the new media 
has increased polarization by enabling individuals to 
select outlets that are already in line with their ideolo-
gies. In fact, when it comes to getting news about poli-
tics and government, research has shown that different 
political party supporters inhabit different worlds 
with little overlap in the news sources they turn to and 
trust.18 Another way through which these new media 
instruments can fuel polarization is by making it easier 
for regimes to track down and suppress opposition. For 
instance, the 2014 Internet Law in Turkey requires 
internet providers in the country to store the data that 
they collect on web users’ activities and to make it 
available to the authorities upon request for two years. 
There have been numerous cases of people being put 
16 Kadir Has University news, n.d., http://www.khas.edu.tr/en/news/256. 
17 Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How like Minds Unite and Divide 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why 
the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008).
18 Markus Prior, “Media and Political Polarization,” Annual Review of Politi-
cal Science 16 (2013): 101-127.
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on trial in the country on the basis of messages that 
they posted on Twitter and Facebook.19
Meanwhile, the print media faces a climate where 
facts no longer drive the debate and partisanship is 
becoming more dominant. The media themselves often 
wholeheartedly support or even provoke the obstruc-
tive strategies used by political incumbents to disrupt 
their opponents. Furthermore, partisanship directly 
affects which media sources are chosen for political 
news, which further accelerates the trend observed for 
social media usage—i.e., that people are likely to hear 
views largely in line with their own thinking. 
19 Thomas Carothers, “Why Technology Hasn’t Delivered More Democra-
cy,” Carnegie Endowment, June 3, 2015, accessed March 20, 2017, http://
carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/03/why-technology-hasn-t-deliv-
ered-more-democracy-pub-60305.
9E L I T E  ATT I T U D E S  TOWA R D S  P O L A R I Z AT I O N
Our findings attest that elite polarization in Turkey 
extends to the elite’s own views on the existence of 
polarization in the country. In other words, the Turkish 
elite fundamentally disagrees on whether polarization 
exists in Turkey, depending on their relative proximity 
to the government. This disagreement includes their 
views on the impact of the July 15th coup attempt on 
polarization in Turkey. Whereas for the pro-govern-
ment elite, the coup attempt has helped to bridge 
whatever polarization had existed, those critical of 
the government argue that it helped to divide Turkish 
society further.
Insights from the Closed Workshop
The most striking finding of this research is that 
those who define themselves as AKP supporters and 
hold office within the government deny that Turkish 
society is polarized. According to one government 
official, Turkish society has always been polarized to 
some extent, so problems of political polarization are 
nothing new. Another government official emphasized 
that, as an apolitical party, the AKP receives electoral 
support from both ends of the spectrum, which he 
used as evidence of the lack of polarization. In a 
similar vein, these participants believe that political 
polarization significantly declined after the July 15th 
coup attempt. According to one of the participants, 
one of the major reasons for this is a newly found value 
in the Turkish flag. This participant put forward the 
argument that the Islamist worldview was not in the 
past used to embrace the idea of the Turkish state as 
much as it does now, with the idea of “belonging to the 
nation” becoming stronger than ever after the coup 
attempt. Some participants who politically identified 
themselves with the AKP even reacted to the idea of 
a workshop on polarization—claiming that this is a 
debate spread by foreign powers to further unsettle the 
country. Another government official described what 
is happening currently in Turkey as a period of transi-
tion rather than polarization, in which secular elites 
are increasingly being replaced by conservative elites. 
Another defined it as the transformation of the state 
apparatus to conservative values. They claimed that 
the discourse of “political polarization” was a political 
reaction to this genuine transformation. 
While pro-AKP participants define polarization as a 
perception and not as an existing fact, other partici-
pants from a wide ideological range but all sharing a 
considerable political distance from the government 
highlight polarization as one of the most urgent prob-
lems of Turkey. They are also united in their belief 
that polarization increased after the coup attempt of 
July 15th and with the referendum on the presidential 
system. Hence, it was observed that the elites them-
selves were polarized around the idea of polarization. 
There were multiple grounds on which arguments in 
favor of the existence of polarization were put forward 
by these participants, many of which were also identi-
fied in the literature alluded to above. 
The constant electioneering mode aggravated further 
by the referendum on the presidential system, the 
Kulturkampf between religious and secular values and 
lifestyles, the existent populist mode of governance, 
institutional decay, politicians’ discourses, media 
representations, violence by the Islamic State (ISIS) 
and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê-PKK), and the lack of democracy and the 
rule of law were commonly cited as the root causes 
of the increasing levels of polarization in society. All 
converged on the view that the inclusion/exclusion 
nexus amplified by these dynamics created a fertile 
ground for polarization to grow. As one of the political 
scientists in the workshop succinctly pointed out, 
“when an individual is a part of a group that feels 
safe, he/she has the tendency not to empathize or 
even understand what happens to other individuals 
from groups that feel threatened,” which in turn fuels 
polarization for these individuals. Participants of 
Kurdish origin especially focused on how they have 
been categorized as the “Other” and how their identi-
ties have been completely securitized, especially after 
the June 7 elections. They argued that the framing of 
Kurdish identity as an existential threat to the Turkish 
Republic significantly increased ethnic polarization 
in the country. Some participants also focused on how 
they felt excluded from the “spirit of Yenikapı,” which 
claims to be inclusive. Thus for them, the measures 
taken in the aftermath of the coup attempt fueled polit-
ical polarization by deepening the inclusion/exclusion 
nexus instead of bringing the public together, as argued 
by the pro-AKP elites. Participants of Alevi origin in 
particular echoed this sentiment, which signaled a 
sectarian polarization and stressed the necessity for 
inclusive and credible public institutions in the country. 
In fact, the decline in the credibility of public institu-
tions was one of the major themes that emerged from 
the workshop. Another theme that was emphasized 
was the polarization of education along secular and 
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conservative lines. In particular, the de-secularization 
of public education, both through transforming many 
public schools into religious schools and through 
changes in the curriculum, was emphasized as one of 
the major causes of polarization.
The workshop participants reached a consensus only 
over two issues: a) that merit-based recruitment is the 
most important measure to strengthen the legitimacy 
of public institutions and thus decrease (perceived or 
real) polarization; and b) that changes in the media 
environment can help polarize or depolarize the citi-
zens exposed to it. At the end of the workshop, five small 
groups were convened where the participants were 
asked to come together and identify five major areas of 
polarization. The small-group workshop encouraged 
participants with radically different views on political 
polarization to reach a consensus in small groups. 
However, two groups were unable to reach a consensus 
over these five issues. One group decided that every 
participant should state their own view by identifying 
one striking problem of polarization. The other group 
only reached a consensus regarding two issues that 
they saw as important for political polarization. The 
remaining three groups were able to reach a consensus 
focused on inclusive institutions, democracy, the rule 
of law, the discourse of political elites, increased parti-
sanship in the media, the EU’s role, and recognition 
and respect for groups that we see as the Other(s). 
Insights from the Interviews
The elite interviews similarly reveal that there is 
sharp polarization among the political elite regarding 
the existence and level of polarization in Turkey. 
For example, an HDP parliamentarian argued that 
polarization is a systematic governing strategy for the 
government:
I am convinced that polarization in society is 
deepening and the government is systematically 
using polarization as a strategy to govern easily. I 
believe that polarization has helped the ruling party 
to consolidate its critical mass to win elections… 
But I think the level of polarization is getting very 
risky for the country’s peace because all segments of 
society are being radicalized: both the opponents of 
the government and those who are pro-government. 
I think this is a very serious handicap in terms of 
social communication.20
20 Interview with an HDP parliamentarian conducted by Pınar Akpınar, 
January 4, 2017.
 A CHP parliamentarian expressed a similar view:
We need to name polarization as a major problem, 
especially after the July 15th coup attempt. Actu-
ally, we have been living in a very polarized society 
since the June 7 elections. Let’s say that, with July 
15, after the declaration of the state of emergency, 
polarization became a little bit more legal, a little 
bit more institutionalized. Polarization is Turkey’s 
biggest problem right now. It is a terrible thing, 
starting from the top and spreading to the bottom, 
alienating people from their neighbors and from 
their families.21 
Another member of parliament from the CHP also 
agreed that polarization has increased since the July 
15th coup attempt:
The amendment of the Constitution immediately 
after the coup attempt has tremendously increased 
polarization. Now, because of this referendum, 
Turkey is divided into two camps. Public opinion 
polls show that the population is divided down the 
middle, fifty-fifty; this is pretty similar in other 
contexts as well. Turkey is divided into two halves… 
This has increased after the declaration of the 
state of emergency. We need to get back to normal 
politics quickly. OHAL (the state of emergency) 
should have not been extended. A huge victimized 
population has been created everywhere around 
Turkey. This is alarming… The political climate is 
toxic. People call each other traitors every day… The 
judiciary as an institution has also become a major 
contributor to this polarizing political climate.22
Similar to the workshops, exclusion on grounds of 
identity and values, the majoritarian mode of political 
governance, the lack of democracy and the rule of law, 
constant electioneering mode, and the lack of trans-
parency, meritocracy, and accountability in the state 
apparatus were commonly cited by these members of 
parliament as the main reasons behind the perceived 
high levels of polarization in Turkey. 
However, starkly opposite views were observed to 
be present across the AKP members of parliament 
and the former MHP member that were interviewed. 
The former MHP parliamentarian disagreed that 
polarization increased after the July 15th coup attempt. 
According to him, the increasing polarization, which 
21 Interview with a CHP parliamentarian conducted by Pınar Akpınar, Jan-
uary 4, 2017.
22 Interview with a CHP parliamentarian conducted by Pınar Akpınar, Jan-
uary 4, 2017.
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began with the Gezi movement, has in fact decreased 
since July 15th because of the Yenikapı spirit, which 
brought all political parties together (with the excep-
tion of the HDP). In a similar vein, one high-level 
government official completely denied that there was 
polarization, particularly along secular-conservative 
lines. He also stressed that there was freedom to choose 
lifestyles. When asked why he thought there was no 
polarization, he cited the country’s imperial past, which 
forced Turkey’s population to coexist peacefully. When 
further asked why polarization is widely discussed 
across elite networks, he argued that polarization 
seems to occur only because of the media and foreign 
provocation. In fact, he claimed that foreign provoca-
tion was behind key polarizing events in the past such 
as the Sivas massacre in 1993, with the intention to 
destroy the harmony of Turkish society. 23
In short, while the HDP and CHP elites think that 
Turkey is deeply polarized, the AKP elites and the 
former MHP member of parliament think the opposite. 
While the AKP elites believe that there has never been 
an increase in polarization during the AKP govern-
ments’ terms, the former MHP member of parliament 
has expressed that polarization decreased since the 
July 15th coup attempt. The interviews support the 
findings from the workshop, in which incumbent elites 
and those that are close to them strongly denied that 
polarization is an issue whereas their political oppo-
nents overwhelmingly highlighted that this is the most 
critical issue for Turkey.
23 Interview with a former MHP parliamentarian conducted by Pınar 
Akpınar, January 4, 2017.
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C O N C LUS I O NS  A N D  P O L I C Y  R EC O M M E N DAT I O NS
By way of conclusion, we can argue that Turkey’s 
elites are so polarized that they cannot even near a 
consensus over whether polarization exists in the 
country. Drawing on the insights from the workshop 
and the interviews, particularly regarding the reasons 
put forward for polarization and the possible solutions 
towards tackling it, the following policy recommenda-
tions can be made in attaining societal reconciliation in 
Turkey:
• Discourse matters in the conduct of politics and 
its ramifications on society: The partisan lan-
guage used by politicians is often identified as 
increasing polarization, so it is important that 
they opt for a more inclusive language that cov-
ers all segments of society without designating 
“Other”(s) as the enemy. 
• The same holds true for media discourse. The 
partisan language used by the media is widely 
expressed as a factor that increases polariza-
tion by different political groups. This is indeed 
a rare point that binds the elites from different 
political backgrounds together, regardless of 
their differing views on the extent of polariza-
tion in the country, pointing at the significance 
of press freedom and inclusive language in the 
media. However, it also needs to be kept in mind 
that the media is no longer confined to classi-
cal media outlets. In the new media environ-
ment, everyone can become an instant journal-
ist. Thus, a social media ethics course should be 
taught at an early age, and citizens should create 
awareness of the responsibilities of using social 
media. 
• A decline in the credibility of public institutions 
because of partisan recruitment and ideologi-
cal decision-making procedures is shown to in-
crease polarization. Utmost importance should 
therefore be given to establishing inclusive 
institutions and ensuring meritocratic recruit-
ment and the rule of law in the post July 15th in-
stitutional reconstruction process in Turkey.
• Education unites: When access to quality educa-
tion declines, polarization is found to increase. 
There is thus a need for a radical reform of public 
education, including the taking of precautions 
against the desecularization of public educa-
tion and the increasing privatization of secular 
education. Social pluralism and state secularism 
should be guaranteed through a comprehensive 
reform of the education system.
• Violence (either physical or cultural) divides 
and polarizes, so political issues should be dis-
cussed without resorting to violence. Securiti-
zation and criminalization of ethnic or religious 
identities should be completely avoided.
• It is well known that in many cases, elite po-
larization precedes popular polarization. Since 
elites have various channels to communicate 
with one another, the necessary measures 
should be taken to ensure that those mecha-
nisms are effective in fostering intra-elite dia-
logue. In particular, legislative organs such as 
parliamentary commissions should be made 
more effective. Efforts to increase channels of 
dialogue among different segments of society 
should coexist with these measures. 
• A new constitution based on equal citizenship 
is a prerequisite for any efforts towards soci-
etal reconciliation in Turkey. This would set 
the much-needed legislative framework for so-
cial inclusion and democratic institutions that 
would in turn help to reduce polarizing tensions 
in society. Implementation would prove crucial 
for the effectiveness of the new constitution. 
• In today’s world, it is no longer possible to com-
pletely disentangle domestic politics from for-
eign policy initiatives. This is specifically the 
case for Turkey’s relations with the European 
Union (EU), which have been suffering from 
substantial stagnation over the past decade. 
Despite the deteriorating relations between 
the two sides at the macro level, the potential 
role of the EU in promoting democratization 
and alleviating polarization in Turkey has been 
raised by a number of participants in the closed 
workshop. The revitalization of Turkey’s rela-
tions with the EU could help to strengthen the 
EU’s anchorage for domestic political reforms in 
Turkey, which could in turn aid in strengthening 
democracy and reducing the levels of polariza-
tion in the country. 
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